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[also Indo-Pakistani War]
| State |
Entry |
Exit |
Combat Forces |
Population |
Losses |
| India |
1971 |
1971 |
1260000 |
700000000 |
20000 |
| Pakistan |
1971 |
1971 |
400000 |
84000000 |
4000 |
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In December 1970 Pakistan held general elections, its first since independence. The Awami League, headed by East Pakistan's popular Bengali leader Mujibur Rahman (Sheikh
Mujib; 1920-75), won a majority of seats in the new assembly, but West Pakistan's chief martial law administrator and president, General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, refused to honour the democratic choice of his nation's majority. At the end of March 1971, after failed negotiations in which Mujib demanded virtual independence for East Pakistan, Yahya Khan ordered a military massacre in Dhaka (Dacca). Though Mujib was arrested and flown to prison in West Pakistan, he called upon his followers in the east to rise up and proclaim their independence as Bangladesh ("Land of the Bengalis"). No fewer than 10 million refugees fled East Pakistan across the border to India in the ensuing eight months of martial rule and sporadic firing by West Pakistan's army. Soon after the monsoon stopped, India's army moved up to the Bangladesh border and by early December advanced virtually unopposed to Dhaka, which was surrendered in mid-December 1971.
Mujib, released by President Bhutto, who had taken over from the disgraced Yahya Khan, flew home to a hero's welcome and in January 1972 became the first prime minister of the People's Republic of Bangladesh.
India's stunning victory over Pakistan in the Bangladesh war was achieved in part because of Soviet military support and diplomatic assurances. The Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation, signed in 1971 by India with the Soviet Union, gave India the arms it used in the war. With the birth of Bangladesh, India's position in South Asia became dominant, and its foreign policy, which remained officially nonaligned, tilted toward the Soviet Union.
*****
The origins of the third Indo-Pakistani conflict (1971) were different from
the previous conflicts. The Pakistani failure to accommodate demands for
autonomy in East Pakistan in 1970 led to secessionist demands in 1971 (see The
Rise of Indira Gandhi, ch. 1). In March 1971, Pakistan's armed forces launched a
fierce campaign to suppress the resistance movement that had emerged but
encountered unexpected mass defections among East Pakistani soldiers and police.
The Pakistani forces regrouped and reasserted their authority over most of East
Pakistan by May.
As a result of these military actions, thousands of East Pakistanis died at
the hands of the Pakistani army. Resistance fighters and nearly 10 million
refugees fled to sanctuary in West Bengal, the adjacent Indian state. By
midsummer, the Indian leadership, in the absence of a political solution to the
East Pakistan crisis, had fashioned a strategy designed to assist the
establishment of the independent nation of Bangladesh. As part of this strategy,
in August 1971, India signed a twenty-year Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and
Cooperation with the Soviet Union. One of the treaty's clauses implied that each
nation was expected to come to the assistance of the other in the event of a
threat to national security such as that occurring in the 1965 war with
Pakistan. Simultaneously, India organized, trained, and provided sanctuary to
the Mukti Bahini (meaning Liberation Force in Bengali), the East Pakistani armed
resistance fighters.
Unable to deter India's activities in the eastern sector, on December 3,
1971, Pakistan launched an air attack in the western sector on a number of
Indian airfields, including Ambala in Haryana, Amritsar in Punjab, and Udhampur
in Jammu and Kashmir. The attacks did not succeed in inflicting substantial
damage. The Indian air force retaliated the next day and quickly achieved air
superiority. On the ground, the strategy in the eastern sector marked a
significant departure from previous Indian battle plans and tactics, which had
emphasized set-piece battles and slow advances. The strategy adopted was a
swift, three-pronged assault of nine infantry divisions with attached armored
units and close air support that rapidly converged on Dhaka, the capital of East
Pakistan. Lieutenant General Sagat Singh, who commanded the eighth,
twenty-third, and fifty-seventh divisions, led the Indian thrust into East
Pakistan. As these forces attacked Pakistani formations, the Indian air force
rapidly destroyed the small air contingent in East Pakistan and put the Dhaka
airfield out of commission. In the meantime, the Indian navy effectively
blockaded East Pakistan. Dhaka fell to combined Indian and Mukti Bahini forces
on December 16, bringing a quick end to the war.
Action in the western sector was divided into four segments, from the
cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir to the marshes of the Rann of Kutch in
northwestern Gujarat. On the evening of December 3, the Pakistani army launched
ground operations in Kashmir and Punjab. It also started an armored operation in
Rajasthan. In Kashmir, the operations were concentrated on two key points, Punch
and Chhamb. The Chhamb area witnessed a particularly intense battle where the
Pakistanis forced the Indians to withdraw from their positions. In other parts
of Kashmir, the Indians made some small gains along the cease-fire line. The
major Indian counteroffensive came in the Sialkot-Shakargarh area south and west
of Chhamb. There, two Pakistani tank regiments, equipped with United States-made
Patton tanks, confronted the Indian First Armored Corps, which had British
Centurion tanks. In what proved to be the largest tank battle of the war, both
sides suffered considerable casualties.
Though the Indian conduct of the land war on the western front was somewhat
timid, the role of the Indian air force was both extensive and daring. During
the fourteen-day war, the air force's Western Command conducted some 4,000
sorties. There was little retaliation by Pakistan's air force, partly because of
the paucity of non-Bengali technical personnel. Additionally, this lack of
retaliation reflected the deliberate decision of the Pakistan Air Force
headquarters to conserve its forces because of heavy losses incurred in the
early days of the war.
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