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Sihanouk was away on a trip to Moscow and Beijing when General Lon Nol
launched a successful coup d'état. On the morning of March 18, 1970, the
National Assembly was hastily convened, and voted unanimously to depose Sihanouk
as head of state. Lon Nol, who had been serving as prime minister, was granted
emergency powers. Sirik Matak, an ultraconservative royal prince who in 1941 had
been passed over by the French in favor of his cousin Norodom Sihanouk as king,
retained his post as deputy prime minister. The new government emphasized that
the transfer of power had been totally legal and constitutional, and it received
the recognition of most foreign governments.
Most middle-class and educated Khmers in Phnom Penh had grown weary of
Sihanouk and apparently welcomed the change of government. But he was still
popular in the villages. Days after the coup, the prince, now in Beijing,
broadcast an appeal to the people to resist the usurpers. Demonstrations and
riots occurred throughout the country. In one incident on March 29, an estimated
40,000 peasants began a march on the capital to demand Sihanouk's reinstatement.
They were dispersed, with many casualties, by contingents of the armed forces
and the Khmer Serei.
From Beijing, Sihanouk proclaimed his intention to create a National United
Front of Kampuchea (Front Uni National du Kampuchéa--FUNK). In the prince's words, this front would embrace "all Khmer both
inside and outside the country-- including the faithful, religious people,
military men, civilians, and men and women who cherish the ideals of
independence, democracy, neutrality, progressivism, socialism, Buddhism,
nationalism, territorial integrity, and anti-imperialism." A coalition,
brokered by the Chinese, was hastily formed between the prince and the KCP. On
May 5, 1970, the actual establishment of FUNK and of the Royal Government of
National Union of Kampuchea (Gouvernement Royal d'Union Nationale du
Kampuchéa--GRUNK),
were announced. Sihanouk assumed the post of GRUNK head of state, appointing
Penn Nouth, one of his most loyal supporters, as prime minister. Khieu Samphan
was designated deputy prime minister, minister of defense, and commander in
chief of the GRUNK armed forces (though actual military operations were directed
by Pol Pot). Hu Nim became minister of information, and Hou Yuon assumed
multiple responsibilities as minister of interior, communal reforms, and
cooperatives. GRUNK claimed that it was not a government-in-exile because Khieu
Samphan and the insurgents remained inside Cambodia.
For Sihanouk and the KCP, this was an extremely useful marriage of
convenience. Peasants, motivated by loyalty to the monarchy, rallied to the FUNK
cause. The appeal of the Sihanouk-KCP coalition grew immensely after October 9,
1970, when Lon Nol abolished the monarchy and redesignated Cambodia as the Khmer
Republic. The concept of a republic was not popular with most villagers, who had
grown up with the idea that something was seriously awry in a Cambodia without a
monarch.
GRUNK operated on two tiers. Sihanouk and his loyalists remained in Beijing,
although the prince did make a visit to the "liberated areas" of
Cambodia, including Angkor Wat, in March 1973. The KCP commanded the insurgency
within the country. Gradually, the prince was deprived of everything but a
passive, figurehead role in the coalition. The KCP told people inside Cambodia
that expressions of support for Sihanouk would result in their liquidation, and
when the prince appeared in public overseas to publicize the GRUNK cause, he was
treated with almost open contempt by Ieng Sary and Khieu Samphan. In June 1973,
the prince told the Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci that when "they [the
Khmer Rouge] no longer need me, they will spit me out like a cherry pit!"
By the end of that year, Sihanouk loyalists had been purged from all of GRUNK's
ministries.
The 1970 coup d'état that toppled Sihanouk dragged Cambodia into the vortex
of a wider war. The escalating conflict pitted government troops, now renamed
the Khmer National Armed Forces (Forces Armées Nationales Khmères--FANK), initially against the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong, and
subsequently against the old RAK, now revitalized and renamed the Cambodian
People's National Liberation Armed Forces (CPNLAF).
As combat operations quickly disclosed, the two sides were mismatched. The
inequality lay not so much in sheer numbers. Thousands of young urban Cambodians
flocked to join FANK in the months following the coup and, throughout its
five-year life, the republican government forces held a numerical edge over
their opponents, the padded payrolls and the phantom units reported in the press
notwithstanding. Instead, FANK was outclassed in training and leadership. With
the surge of recruits, the government forces expanded beyond their capacity to
absorb the new inductees. Later, given the press of tactical operations and the
need to replace combat casualties, there was insufficient time to impart needed
skills to individuals or to units, and lack of training remained the bane of
FANK's existence until its collapse. While individual soldiers and some
government units fought bravely, their leaders-- with notable exceptions--were
both corrupt and incompetent. Arrayed against an armed force of such limited
capability was arguably the best light infantry in the world at the time--the
North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong. And when there forces were supplanted, it
was by the tough, rigidly indoctrinated peasant army of the CPNLAF with its core
of Khmer Rouge leaders.
With the fall of Sihanouk, the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong became
alarmed at the prospect of a pro-Western regime that might allow the United
States to establish a military presence on their western flank. To prevent this
from happening, they began transferring their military installations away from
the border area to locations deeper within Cambodian territory. A new command
center was established at the city of Kracheh (Kratié). On April 29, 1970,
South Vietnamese and United States units unleashed a multi-pronged offensive
into Cambodia to destroy the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), the
headquarters for North Vietnamese and Viet Cong combat operations in South
Vietnam. Extensive logistical installations and large amounts of supplies were
found and destroyed, but as reporting from the United States MACV subsequently
disclosed, still larger amounts of material already had been moved deeper into
Cambodia.
The North Vietnamese army turned on the republican government forces, and by
June 1970, three months after the coup, they and the CPNLAF had swept FANK from
the entire northeastern third of the country. After defeating the government
forces, they turned newly won territories over to the local insurgents. The
Khmer Rouge also established "liberated areas" in the south and the
southwestern parts of the country, where they operated independently of the
Vietnamese. The KCP's debt to the North Vietnamese after March 1970 was one that
Pol Pot was loath to acknowledge; however, it is clear that without North
Vietnamese and Viet Cong assistance, the revolutionary struggle would have
dragged on much longer than it did.
United States bombing of enemy troop dispositions in Cambodia-- particularly
in the summer of 1973, when intense aerial bombardment (known as Arclight) was
used to halt a Khmer Rouge assault on Phnom Penh--bought time for the Lon Nol
government, but did not stem the momentum of the communist forces. United States
official documents give a figure of 79,959 sorties by B-52 and F-111 aircraft
over the country, during which a total of 539,129 tons of ordnance were dropped,
about 350 percent of the tonnage (153,000 tons) dropped on Japan during World
War II. Many of the bombs that fell in Cambodia struck relatively uninhabited
mountain or forest regions; however, as declassified United States Air Force
maps show, others fell over some of the most densely inhabited areas of the
country, such as Siemreab Province, Kampong Chhnang Province, and the
countryside around Phnom Penh. Deaths from the bombing are extremely difficult
to estimate, and figures range from a low of 30,000 to a high of 500,000.
Whatever the real extent of the casualties, the Arclight missions over Cambodia,
which were halted in August 15, 1973, by the United States Congress, delivered
shattering blows to the structure of life in many of the country's villages,
and, according to some critics, drove the Cambodian people into the arms of the
Khmer Rouge.
The bombing was by far the most controversial aspect of the United States
presence in Cambodia. In his book Sideshow, William Shawcross provides
a vivid image of the hellish conditions, especially in the months of January to
August 1973, when the Arclight sorties were most intense. He claims that the
bombing contributed to the forging of a brutal and singlemindedly fanatical
Khmer Rouge movement. However, his arguments have been disputed by several
United States officials--including the former ambassador to Cambodia, Emory C.
Swank, and the former Air Force commander in Thailand, General John W. Vogt--in
an appendix to the second volume of the memoirs of then Secretary of State,
Henry Kissinger.
From the Khmer Rouge perspective, however, the severity of the bombings was
matched by the treachery of the North Vietnamese. The Cambodian communists had
refused to take part in the Paris peace talks. When North Vietnam and the United
States signed the Paris Peace Accords on January 27, 1973, bombing missions over
Vietnam and Laos were terminated. The fighter bombers and other aircraft thus
released were diverted to strike Khmer Rouge positions in Cambodia.
One of the earliest accounts of life under the Khmer Rouge was written in
1973 by a school administrator, Ith Sarin, who had joined the movement after
becoming disillusioned with Lon Nol and the Khmer Republic, then rose to the
status of candidate member of the KCP, but left the party and returned to Phnom
Penh after nine months in the underground. His work, Regrets for the Khmer
Soul (in Khmer, Sranaoh Pralung Khmer), it revealed the secrecy
with which the Khmer Rouge concealed the existence of the communist party, which
they referred to by the sinister term Angkar Loeu (High Organization), or
simply, Angkar. The KCP Central Committee was referred to as the Kena Mocchhim
(or Committee Machine, mocchhim being derived from the Western term,
"machine").
Territories under Angkar control were well organized. Ith Sarin described a
five-level hierarchy of Angkar-controlled bodies reaching from the six areas, or
phumphaek into which the country was divided down to the hamlet, or phum
level. The Angkar imposed a grim regime in which hatred for Lon Nol, the
Americans, and, at times, the North Vietnamese "allies" was
assiduously cultivated. Expressions of support for Sihanouk were firmly
discouraged and people were encouraged to spy on each other. Discipline was
unremittingly harsh. Ith Sarin concluded from his experience that the great
majority of the people did not like the Angkar and the collective way of life it
imposed, that they despaired that Sihanouk would ever return to power, and that
they would support the Khmer Republic if it carried out genuine reforms. Oddly,
Lon Nol's security forces banned the book for a time on the grounds that it was
"pro-communist." Although this was not true, it did provide a
foretaste of what the entire Cambodian population would endure after April 1975.
Disturbing stories of Khmer Rouge atrocities began to surface as the
communists prepared to deal the coup de grace to the Khmer Republic. In March
1974, they captured the old capital city of Odongk north of Phnom Penh,
destroyed it, dispersed its 20,000 inhabitants into the countryside, and
executed the teachers and civil servants. The same year, they brutally murdered
sixty people, including women and children, in a small village called Sar
Sarsdam in Siemreab Province. A similar incident was reported at Ang Snuol, a
town west of the capital. Other instances of what one observer, Donald Kirk,
described as a "sweeping, almost cosmic policy" of indiscriminate
terror, were recounted by refugees who fled to Phnom Penh or across the Thai
border. Kirk contrasted this behavior with the Viet Cong's use of "a
modicum of care and precision" in applying terror in South Vietnam (for
instance, assassination of landlords or of South Vietnamese officials). Atrocity
stories, however, were considered to be anticommunist propaganda by many, if not
most, Western journalists and other observers; nevertheless, Phnom Penh's
population swelled to as many as 2.5 million people as terrified refugees sought
to escape not only the United States bombing and the ground fighting, but the
harshness of life under the Angkar.
The Khmer Rouge initiated their dry-season offensive to capture the
beleaguered Cambodian capital on January 1, 1975. Their troops controlled the
banks of the Mekong River, and they were able to rig ingenious mines to sink
convoys bringing relief supplies of food, fuel, and ammunition to the slowly
starving city. After the river was effectively blocked in early February, the
United States began airlifts of supplies. This was extremely risky because of
Khmer Rouge rockets. The communists also fired rockets and shells into the city,
causing many civilian deaths. Doomed units of republican soldiers dug in around
the capital; many of them had run out of ammunition, and they were overrun as
the Khmer Rouge advanced. American observers, who generally had little esteem
for FANK officer corps, were impressed by the determination of the Khmer
enlisted men to fight to the end.
On April 1, 1975, President Lon Nol resigned and left the country. His exit
was prompted by fear of certain death if he fell into Khmer Rouge hands. The
communists had included him among "seven traitors" who were marked for
execution. (The others were non-communist, nationalist leaders Sirik Matak, Son
Ngoc Thanh, In Tam, Prime Minister Long Boret, Cheng Heng, who became head of
state after Sihanouk's ouster, and Sosthene Fernandez, the FANK commander in
chief). Saukham Khoy became acting president of a government that had less than
three weeks to live. Last-minute efforts on the part of the United States to
arrange a peace agreement involving Sihanouk ended in failure. On April 12,
United States embassy personnel were evacuated by helicopter. The ambassador,
John Gunther Dean, invited high officials of the Khmer Republic to join them.
But Sirik Matak, Long Boret, Lon Non (Lon Nol's brother), and most members of
Lon Nol's cabinet declined. They chose to share the fate of their people. All
were executed soon after Khmer Rouge units entered Phnom Penh on April 17, 1975.
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