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The economic collapse of the early 1980s, continuing the long-term cyclical
decline begun in the late 1960s, brought into sharp focus the country's social
deterioration, particularly in the more isolated and backward regions of the
Sierra. Infant mortality rose to 120 per 1,000 births (230 in some remote
areas), life expectancy for males dropped to 58 compared with 64 in neighboring
Chile, average daily caloric intake fell below minimum United Nations standards,
upwards of 60 percent of children under five years of age were malnourished, and
underemployment and unemployment were rampant. Such conditions were a breeding
ground for social and political discontent, which erupted with a vengeance in
1980 [as of May 17, 1980] with the appearance of the Shining Path (Sendero
Luminoso--SL).
Founded in the remote and impoverished department of Ayacucho by Abimáel
Guzmán Reynoso, a philosophy professor at the University of Huamanga, the SL
blended the ideas of MarxismLeninism , Maoism, and those of José Carlos
Mariátegui,
Peru's major Marxist theoretician. Taking advantage of the return to democratic
rule, the deepening economic crisis, the failure of the Velasco-era reforms, and
a generalized vacuum of authority in parts of the Sierra with the collapse of gamonal
rule, the SL unleashed a virulent and highly effective campaign of terror and
subversion that caught the Belaúnde government by surprise.
After first choosing to ignore the SL and then relying on an ineffective
national police response, Belaúnde reluctantly turned to the army to try to
suppress the rebels. However, that proved extremely difficult to do. The SL
expanded its original base in Ayacucho north along the Andean spine and
eventually into Lima and other cities, gaining young recruits frustrated by
their dismal prospects for a better future. To further complicate pacification
efforts, another rival guerrilla group, the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement
(Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru--MRTA), emerged in Lima.
Counterinsurgency techniques, often applied indiscriminately by the armed
forces, resulted in severe human rights violations against the civilian
population and only created more recruits for the SL. By the end of Belaúnde's
term in 1985, over 6,000 Peruvians had died from the violence, and over US$1
billion in property damage had resulted. Strongly criticized by international
human rights organizations, Belaúnde nevertheless continued to rely on military
solutions, rather than other emergency social or developmental measures that
might have served to get at some of the fundamental, underlying socioeconomic
causes of the insurgency...
The social history of the 1960s and 1970s is background for the emergence of
the disturbing Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso-- SL) movement. Its many violent
actions have been directed against locally elected municipal officials and
anyone designated as a gamonal in the departments of Ayacucho,
Huancavelica, Apurímac, Junín, Huánuco, and portions of Ancash and Cusco
departments, as well as some other areas designated as emergency zones where
government control was deeply compromised. The Maoist-oriented SL opposed Lima
as the metropolis that usurps resources from the rest of the nation. Like most
past revolutionary movements (as opposed to peasant revolts) acting on behalf of
the poor, the SL leadership has consisted of disgruntled and angry
intellectuals, mestizos, and whites, apparently from provincial backgrounds.
Many adherents have been recruited from university and high school ranks, where
radical politicization has been a part of student culture since the late
nineteenth century. Others have come from the cadres of embittered migrant
youths living in urban lower-class surroundings, disaffected and frustrated
school teachers, and the legions of alienated peasants in aggrieved highland
provinces in Huancavelica, Ayacucho, and adjacent areas.
Peru's socioeconomic and political disarray has taken on its present pattern
after four decades of extravagant demographic change, a truncated land reform
that never received effective funding or ancillary support as needed in
education, and incessant promises of development, jobs, and progress without
fulfillment. The SL has sought to eliminate the perpetrators of past error to
establish a new order of its own. The SL's vengeful approach appeared attractive
to many, coming at a time when the migration pathway to social change appeared
blocked, the ability to progress by this method stymied by the economic crisis,
and rural development was at an all-time low ebb.
The immediate impact of the terror-inspiring violence of SL actions and the
correspondingly symmetrical responses of the Peruvian Arm (Ejército Peruano--EP)
has had a devastating effect on rural and urban life, public institutions, and
agricultural production, especially in the emergency zone department of Ayacucho.
Since the SL's first brutal attack on the defenseless people of Chuschi, its
actions and the violent reactions of the police and army have produced chaos
throughout the central highlands and deep problems in Lima.
From 1980 to 1990, an estimated 200,000 persons were driven from their homes,
with about 18,000 people killed, mostly in the department of Ayacucho and
neighboring areas. In five provinces in Ayacucho, the resident population
dropped by two-thirds, and many villages were virtual ghost towns. This
migration went to Lima, Ica, and Huancayo, where disoriented peasants were
offered little assistance and sometimes were attacked by the police as suspected
Senderistas (SL members). Many communities have responded to SL attacks by
organizing and fighting back. Towns or villages in La Libertad and Cajamarca
departments, in particular, greatly amplified the system of rondas
campesinas. Elsewhere, the army organized local militias and patrols to
combat and ferret out SL cadres. Unfortunately, in addition to providing for
defense all of these actions left room for abuses, and there were numerous cases
of personal vendettas taking place that had little to do with the task.
*****
Burt, Jo-Marie and Jose
Lopez Ricci. "Shining Path After Guzmán." NACLA Report on the
Americas 28/3 (Nov-Dec 1994): 6-9.
Discusses the future of
Sendero Luminoso after Guzmán began calling for peace talks with the Peruvian
government one year after his capture [on or before September 13, 1992]. Sendero continues under
the leadership of Oscar Ramirez Durand, known as "Comrade Feliciano".
Although the violence in the country has decreased drastically, Sendero still
strikes periodically.
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