One could say that there were really two battles for Moscow. The first one began in 1940 when the German military began planning a Blitzkrieg campaign against the Soviet Union. From a military perspective there were several factors that made Moscow an important objective in any campaign against the Soviet Union. Moscow was the state capital and its capture would disrupt the government. It was a large industrial center and an important hub in the Soviet railway network. Its capture would cut off Soviet links with the northwestern USSR, thereby ensuring the capture of Leningrad and seriously weakening Soviet contact with the southwest. This result would effectively outflank a Soviet defense in the Ukraine and threaten a deep envelopment of any Soviet forces remaining there.

Adolf Hitler did not share his generals' enthusiasm for attacking Moscow first and it was his intentions that were reflected. The official German plan, Directive 21 -- Operation Barbarossa, did not emphasize or sanction the attack Moscow as a priority. Moscow was ranked as less important than Leningrad. In fact, the plan called for the diversion of armored assets from the Moscow axis after the capture of Smolensk in support of the northern drive towards Leningrad. The advance towards Moscow was to continue only in the event of an extremely favorable strategic position after reaching Smolensk. Perhaps the old military saying about a plan not surviving the first encounter with the enemy held sway with the German generals. This might explain why this plan did not reflect the army's opinion on the matter of the importance of Moscow.

Under Directive 21, the German armed forces available for the campaign in the Soviet Union were divided into three army groups. Army Group North was assigned the task of driving along a single axis northeastward through the Baltic republics with the objective of occupying Leningrad. Army Group Center was to attack eastward along two axes north of the Pripet Marsh with the progressive goals of Minsk, Smolensk and ultimately Moscow. Army Group South was intended to strike southeast toward Kiev with the drive to continue in the general direction of Stalingrad on the Volga. The ultimate objective of the campaign was to reach a line of roughly the Ural mountains in the north and the Volga river in the south.

German force deployment for the campaign against the Soviet Union suggested, however, what after the war ended became fairly common knowledge: the German army general staff believed that the capture of Moscow was the highest priority of the campaign against the Soviet Union. To this end the German army deployed two of the four panzer groups available on the central front aimed for Moscow. In all, more men, more tanks and more aircraft were deployed with Army Group Center and directed towards Moscow than with either of the other army groups. The military's intentions for the campaign, therefore, were reflected in the force distributions and the underlying, yet tacit, agreement of the commanders responsible for the operation.

The divergent views of Hitler and the army over the ultimate strategic direction of the campaign had little impact on the operation when it began on June 22, 1941. During the first weeks of the invasion the Germans broke through Soviet defensive lines with such relative ease that not much consideration was given to the conflicting objectives laid out in the original plan. Yet, even though the campaign against the Soviet Union seemed to be proceeding smoothly, factors which would bring the German dispute over strategic direction into the open were evident before the Battle of Smolensk began in the middle of July.

At that time Army Group North was advancing at a satisfactory pace and was closing in on Leningrad -- it did not appear to require additional panzer troops, called for in the original plan, to reach its objectives. Army Group Center had achieved an overwhelming victory against the Soviet forces opposing it and was well positioned to strike at Moscow in the immediate future. Army Group South, however, had encountered far heavier opposition than anticipated and it was not advancing as quickly as had been hoped. The unexpectedly heavy concentration of Soviet forces in the south accounted for the slowness of the advance on this end of the front.

Differences in the rates of advance were exacerbated by the fact that the army groups were advancing on divergent axes. By early July, this had become painfully apparent in the disposition of forces on the front line. Army Group Center's progress towards Smolensk had created a giant salient in the center of the front. The bulk of its forces were concentrated on the eastward edge and, consequently, it had two relatively exposed flanks which represented inviting targets for Soviet counterattacks. Given that Army Group North was advancing northeastward and Army Group South was advancing southeastward, there was little possibility of these forces providing any coverage for Army Group Center's flanks. Allowing an immediate advance on Moscow by Army Group Center would extend those unprotected flanks, substantially increasing the theoretical risk of a Soviet thrust against them.

The first manifestation of the dispute over strategic direction in the German command system occurred on July 19th when Directive 33 was issued. It instructed Panzer Group 2 to prepare for an advance southward, after the battle of Smolensk was completed, to assist Army Group South. Army Group Center was effectively to be put on the defensive until the completion of this southern excursion. This was not a popular plan among the generals of Army Group Center or of the German Army High Command. In the following weeks, there ensued a series of meetings and the issuance of further directives the results of which were to confirm the initial instructions. Hitler would not back down in the face of military opposition to his plans. The German generals had lost their first battle for Moscow.