Having lost their battle for Moscow with Hitler, the German generals applied themselves to the rapid conclusion of the diversion of Army Group Center's panzers southward with the expectation of advancing on Moscow once this move was complete. Among the benefits of a panzer drive south was that the vulnerable and extended southern flank of Army Group Center would then be secured. Once it was completed, there would be no threat of a northward thrust against the rear of the army group by Soviet forces nominally to the south or southwest of it.

Whether such a threat to the flank of Army Group Center ever existed, however, is open to debate. Despite the fact that the Soviet Southwestern Front was stronger than the fronts opposing the advances of the German army groups further north on the Eastern front, its armies were being pushed back. They had thus far managed to avoid being caught in the destructive battles of encirclement that other Soviet armies had been trapped in, but the Soviet forces fighting Army Group South were not in a position to disengage without risking destruction.

In order for even a small part of these forces to represent a serious threat to the German advance in the center, against Moscow, they would have had to have been fully disengaged in the south first. To do this implied weakening Soviet resistance in the Ukraine. Withdrawing substantial forces would have meant significantly weakening the Soviet defense in the south. Since the Soviet forces in the Ukraine were already being pushed back by the German offensive, doing so would have risked turning what was a battle for the Ukraine into a Soviet rout comparable to that occurring further north. Under these circumstances it was extremely doubtful that an effective Soviet attack could have been mounted against Army Group Center's exposed southern flank.

In the postwar period, under the influence of the writings of German generals involved in Barbarossa campaign -- Guderian in particular, there has been a great deal of attention given to the implications of a successful German attack on Moscow. Some historians, Stolfi for example, have gone so far as to suggest that a German victory in the war against the Soviet Union depended on capturing Moscow before the winter of 1941-42 and that there were no good military reasons for the Germans not achieving this result. Such writings focus on the redirection of panzer forces south -- on Hitler's orders -- as the primary reason the German campaign failed to reach Moscow before the winter. In response, other historians like Glantz have suggested that part of the reason the Germans turned south was the increasing Soviet resistance on the Moscow axis at the time of the Battle of Smolensk and the need to secure Army Group Center's southern flank. These are the same reasons expressed by Hitler in his arguments with the army generals and written into Directives 33 and 34.

In either case, Smolensk is considered the decisive encounter for determining the strategic result of the campaign. The battle of Smolensk was completed on August 5th. According to Glantz, total Soviet casualties in this battle amounted to 344,926 of the 581,600 man strength of their forces engaged in this battle (for the period July 10th to September 10th). The Germans claimed 300,000 prisoners and the destruction of most of the remainder of the 700,000 man strong Soviet force opposing them (by August 5th). Both claims lead to the same conclusion. Army Group Center had severely mauled the Soviet forces in this battle and at the end of it there was no meaningful Soviet resistance left on the road to Moscow. It was early August 1941.

However, in accordance with the revised plan, Army Group Center switched over to the defensive and Panzer Group 2, along with 2nd Army which had been the southern flank of Army Group South, advanced southward beginning on August 23rd. By September 12th, forces of Panzer Group 2, attacking southward, and Panzer Group 1, attacking northeastward, linked up some 160 kilometers east of Kiev. In the process, they encircled a Soviet force of about 600,000 men, effectively collapsing Soviet resistance in the western Ukraine. This movement resulted in a massive German victory over Soviet troops on the southern part of the front but it tied up German forces required for an advance on Moscow until the end of September.

The German forces regrouped for an assault on Moscow in mid-September and operations began on September 31st. In the intervening eight weeks since Army Group Center had last taken the offensive the Soviets had built-up their forces on the Moscow axis and prepared yet another strong defensive position before Moscow. It failed to stop the German offensive. A new series of encirclements ensued and a further 600,000 Soviet troops along with a substantial amount of equipment were lost before the German offensive came to a temporary halt on October 30th. Weather and logistical difficulties were the foremost reasons for this break in the German offensive. But the battle experience also suggested that Soviet resistance was not broken before Moscow.

The Germans resumed their attack towards Moscow on November 15th. However, the supply situation was not substantially improved from that at the end of October and most of the units were severely under strength and unprepared for winter. Soviet troops at the front fared little better but Soviet units that had been held in Siberia up to this time -- against the possibility of a Japanese attack -- were being brought into the strategic reserve at Moscow in preparation for a counteroffensive. German attacks continued with lessening strength against increasing Soviet resistance until December 5th when the operation was officially halted because the prospect of further gains was doubtful. This date generally marks the conclusion of Operation Barbarossa and the German defeat at Moscow. The Soviet winter counteroffensive began on the following day, December 6th.