The destruction of the German 6th Army at Stalingrad has traditionally been considered the turning point of the war in Europe. In order to appreciate how this defeat came about, an understanding of a number of seemingly unrelated events that occurred in the period between the failure of the battle for Moscow in December 1941 and the opening of Operation Blue - the campaign that led to Stalingrad - in June 1942 is required. These developments provided the basis for the erroneous choices that eventually produced the decisive German defeat at Stalingrad.

During the winter of 1941-42, the German army on the Eastern Front panicked. Numerous senior German commanders were dismissed during this period because of it. Among them was Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, Commander in Chief of the Army, who was formally removed by Hitler on December 19th, 1941. Rather than replace Brauchitsch, Hitler assumed the position of Commander in Chief of the Army. He proceeded to ruthlessly enforce the order to stand and fight. By the spring of 1942, the German army recovered from the shock of the Soviet winter counteroffensive and the front was stabilized. There could be no doubt that Hitler deserved some of the credit for saving the army from collapse during the critical winter months, but the success of his inflexibility in this situation clouded his judgment in later crises which called for quite different responses from a commander in chief.

Among the commands that required a replacement as a result of the winter crisis was that of the 6th Army. General Paulus, a staff officer at OKH - the German Army High Command, was given command of 6th Army on January 6th, 1942, on the recommendation of Field Marshal von Reichenau, the former commander of 6th Army and the newly appointed commander of Army Group South. Paulus had never commanded as much as a division or corps when he was given command. Even Hitler expressed reservations about the appointment. Paulus had a reputation as an exceptional operations officer which was enhanced while at OKH where he had been responsible for evaluating the merits of the options for Operation Barbarossa. However, as a commanding officer, he proved to be indecisive and lacking initiative. These character weaknesses would have serious repercussions during several critical moments in the battles that resulted in the encirclement of his army at Stalingrad.

Although the Stalingrad encirclement was the greatest encirclement suffered by the Germans up to that point in time, the previous winter had given the German army experience with sustaining relatively large units trapped behind enemy lines through air supply. The largest of these pockets was Demyansk, where approximately 100,000 German troops held out for seventy-two days. On April 21, 1942 the Demyansk Pocket was successfully relieved by a battle group under the command of General von Seydlitz-Kurzbach - who would eventually command 51st Army Corps in the Stalingrad pocket. The fact that this reinforced army corps survived Soviet encirclement with nothing but air supply was one of the considerations leading to the decision to attempt a similiar operation with the trapped 6th Army at Stalingrad.

Equally significant to later events in Stalingrad was German experience with Soviet offensives in the spring of 1942. Immediately prior to Operation Blue, on May 12th, the Soviet launched an offensive aimed at retaking Kharkov. Initial results were encouraging but the attackers lacked sufficient strength to actually break the German front. It was already being reinforced for the coming German offensive. As the Soviet forces advanced, a German counterattack on the northern and southern flanks cut off the Soviet spearhead and resulted in the destruction of two Soviet armies (6th and 57th Armies). By May 29th the Germans completed their encirclement, resulting in a loss to the Soviets of about 250,000 men. The defeat at Kharkov effectively weakened the Soviet forces along the main axis of advance for the German offensive and thus gave the Wehrmacht a deceptive impression of the actual strength of the Soviet army.

Concurrently, the German 11th Army under General Manstein cleared out the Kerch peninsula by May 15th. Soviet losses were estimated at 150,000 men. The Battle of Sevastopol began immediately thereafter. Fierce Soviet resistance in the city lasted until July 4th. By the time the battle was over some 90,000 Soviet soldiers were taken prisoner and total Soviet losses during the siege and subsequent battle of Sevastopol were estimated at more than 200,000. In contrast, 11th Army suffered about 24,000 casualties. Manstein was promoted to Field Marshal on the basis of the Crimean campaign, particularly the capture of Sevastopol, and he was promptly sent north, along with elements of 11th Army, to Leningrad. The German experience at Sevastopol demonstrated that even a determined defense in a fortified city could not withstand a well coordinated attack by their forces.

Events in the Crimea were important from another perspective as well. From the outset, Rumanian troops were extensively employed in the Crimean campaign and Manstein generally praised their performance in defensive roles. Comparable reports were received from Rommel concerning Italian troops in North Africa. Therefore, it is fairly easy to see why the use of allied troops for filling out the flanks of the expected advances was viewed as a reasonable measure. By 1942 the Germans needed more troops than they could provide and their experience showed that defensive assignments could be given to allied troops. This had serious consequences by the time their forces approached Stalingrad.

All of the developments discussed here had a positive impact on the Third Reich's ability to wage war against the Soviet Union and they influenced the choices made in the coming summer offensive. Historically, a number of erroneous options were chosen as a result. Essentially, though, as the German armed forces prepared to launch the offensive that led to Stalingrad, its officers and men had reason to be optimistic because of their success against the Red Army thus far.