Red Army morale was probably at an all time low when General Chuikov assumed command of the Soviet 62nd Army -- in Stalingrad -- on September 12th. German forces were pushing forward and the hope of holding the city seemed slim indeed. Chuikov, however, took on the task of holding Stalingrad with a determination that few commanders could match. He introduced an aggressive forward defense tactic based on small units holding positions extremely close to the German front line. This provided relative safety from German artillery barrages and air strikes while Soviet artillery, located on the east bank of the Volga, was unrestricted in its ability to fire on German positions and assembly areas. These tactics confounded German combined arms operations in the city of Stalingrad throughout the remainder of the battle of Stalingrad. While in August German advances were measured in kilometers, in September progress was measured in meters. Casualties on both sides were enormous.

By the middle of October the German summer offensive had effectively been reduced to attacks in and around Stalingrad. On October 14th Hitler issued an order formally limiting further operations to the Stalingrad area and along the Terek River in the Caucasus. The military focus of the entire campaign from now on was to be on the capture of Stalingrad. German force concentrations reflected this fact.

German panzer and motorized divisions allocated to the 6th and 4th Panzer Armies were employed in the Stalingrad battle. Armored units were not suitable for street fighting within Stalingrad and panzer troop losses were heavy. The employment of panzer and motorized units within Stalingrad is generally regarded as a serious error since the active engagement of these mobile forces in close quarter combat made them unavailable for use as a mobile reserve in the event of a Soviet counterattack.

The lengthy northern flank of Army Group B -- the corridor to Stalingrad -- was defended primarily by German allied armies. The Hungarian 2nd Army, Italian 8th Army and Rumanian 4th Army protected the northwest corridor to Stalingrad where the German 6th Army and 4th Panzer Army were concentrated, while the Rumanian 3rd Army held the southwestern flank. Compared to their German counterparts, these were weak forces without significant anti-tank defenses or armored reserves.

Soviet flank attacks to the north and south of Stalingrad had been ongoing for some time. In August and September, these attempts to break through the Axis line had proven ineffectual and they served as the basis of the German command's disregard for the danger of such offensives. Rumanian troops, which bore the brunt of these early attacks, chronically warned Army Group B of renewed Soviet attacks. These constant warnings of a pending offensive, which would reach a fevered pitch in November, proved to have a negative impact on the Army Group's willingness to take such reports seriously.

The failures of the early Soviet assaults on the flanks of Stalingrad led to a reevaluation of the situation by the Stavka, the Soviet high command, beginning in mid-September. It concluded that the lack of success could be attributed to insufficient preparation. The troops were inexperienced, the logistic support was inadequate and the command structure ineffective. Stalin ordered Zhukov and Vasilevsky to produce a new plan for an effective counterattack.

They produced the proposals for Operation Uranus -- an ambitious offensive aimed at encircling the German forces in the Stalingrad area by simultaneous attacks on the relatively weakly defended flanking Rumanian 4th (to the northwest) and 3rd (to the southwest) Armies. This plan reflected prewar Soviet military thinking about offensive operations (the "deep battle" concept) which had been discredited by the Great Purges. But, in light of the enormous success of the German Blitzkrieg, these doctrines were now becoming acceptable again. This was a process that was facilitated by the lack of any formal repudiation of these ideas by the Red Army -- just the commanders that had promoted such ideas in the past.

Operation Uranus was originally scheduled to begin early in November but delays in building up the forces considered necessary for the success of this offensive led to a start date of November 19th. The preparations for it were utterly ignored by the German command. In part, this lack of a correct appreciation of Soviet intentions for a massive counteroffensive could be attributed to the excellent concealment practices of the Red Army. However, the total disregard of any reports suggesting a coming Soviet offensive and the complete lack of contingency planning, especially in light of the previous years experience before Moscow, pointed up a serious flaw in the German command system's ability to produce a reasonable analysis of enemy capabilities. Knowledge of the preparations was certainly not lacking. Even Richthofen, commander of the German 4th Air Fleet in the Stalingrad area at the time, commented on the build-up in his diary on November 11th.

Rumanian resistance to the initial onslaught was remarkably effective given the offensive strength of the Soviet forces engaged compared to the defensive capabilities of Rumanian units (which lacked any means of countering Soviet tank attacks). They managed to hold on for a full day before collapsing under the weight of the Soviet assault. Army Group B headquarters initially failed to appreciate the threat and did not respond immediately. In any event, only the under strength 48th Panzer Corps was available in the area to counter the Soviet thrust. When the southern attack opened on the morning of November 20th, against the Rumanian 3rd Army, only the German 29th Motorized Infantry Division was available to block the inevitable breakthrough.

On November 23rd, the Soviet pincers linked up and the encirclement of the Axis forces in Stalingrad was complete. Soviet intentions at this point were to reduce the Stalingrad pocket before proceeding with further offensive operations towards the west, however, they severely underestimated the size of the surrounded German and allied forces. Stavka estimated that they had surrounded a force of about 85,000 men when in fact the figure was closer to 300,000.